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Abstract
This chapter investigates the secrecy-energy trade-offs for communication in wireless
networks. It is shown that privacy requirements for applications such as image or video
transmissions do not require perfect secrecy, and the level of privacy can be quantified
using a Rate-Distortion metric. Using information theoretic analysis, the chapter formu-
lates analytic secrecy trade-offs for various communication channel models. In particu-
lar we analyze the advantage of partial secrecy for the Gaussian and Rayleigh fading
channel models and the MIMO channel. The impact of secrecy requirements and the
inherent secrecy-energy-connectivity trade-offs are also analyzed for networks of wire-
less nodes.
Keywords: partial secrecy, physical layer security, information theoretic secrecy, one
point to one point communication, network level communication
1. Introduction
The secrecy of wireless communication was studied from an information theoretic perspective,
and equivocation rate was defined to characterize secrecy capacity. Equivocation rate mea-
sures the uncertainty that the eavesdropper decodes about the transmitted message with a
certain rate during a transmission. Perfect secrecy can be achieved if the equivocation rate is
equal to the transmitted rate. In this chapter, the notion of partial secrecy is introduced, for the
scenario that perfect secrecy cannot be achieve. The reason for studying partial secrecy is based
on the consideration about another key performance metric of communication systems, energy
efficiency. The energy savings can be obtained when a partial secrecy requirement is enforced.
For many practical applications, such as voice and image transmission, a certain percentage of
loss will be accepted, since decoded data is useless for the eavesdropper. The quality of the
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source data reconstruction for those applications is typically characterized by the rate-distortion
function. For example some certain scenarios will keep the eavesdropped message useless for the
eavesdropper, such as some images for which all the key objects in the image have been
transmitted with perfect secrecy, while the other objects and background in the image that are
not important are transmitted without secrecy constrains.
To characterize the partial secrecy, the physical layer and application layer secrecy requirement
was analyzed jointly. At the physical layer, the equivocation rate characterizes the uncertainty
remaining at the eavesdropper after receiving the transmitted message. At the application
layer, the application layer secrecy would be achieve if there is a close to no message which is
decoded by the eavesdropper at application layer, and from the information theoretic view, the
application layer secrecy is characterized by the rate-distortion function. The application lay
metric is the rate-distortion function, and physical layer secrecy metrics is equivocation, which
directly translates to the secrecy capacity.
In the remaining, the energy-secrecy trade-offs was studied for one point to one point communi-
cation, such as the Gaussian fading channels, MIMO channel and network level communication.
In Section 2, the background was mentioned and in Section 3 systemmodel was introduced, and
in Sections 3 and 4 the partial secrecy in one point to one point communication and in network
level communication has been studied. In Section 5, the further work is depicted.
2. Background
In the chapter, the work is based on the rich literature about information theoretic results for the
secrecy capacity for various channel models. The perfect secrecy was in introduced and the
wire-tap channel model was also first introduced in Ref. [1]. Later, the classic Gaussian wire-tap
channel was introduced in Ref. [2], and the perfect secrecy capacity was first derived. The perfect
secrecy capacity was analyzed for fading channels and multiple antennas, for example, in Refs.
[3, 4]. An extension of the wire-tap channel model when a common message is transmitted was
first proposed in Ref. [5], and it is known as the Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
(BCC). In Ref. [5] capacity-equivocation region and the perfect secrecy capacity of the discrete
memory-less BCC was characterized, while in Refs. [6–8] a more general channel model for the
fading BCCwas considered. Further results of the secrecy capacity of the BCCwas studied [9–11].
Also more recently, multi-users extensions of the wiretap channel and broadcast channel have
been investigated in Refs. [1, 12]. The multi-receivers wire-tap channel was considered, and its
perfect secrecy capacity was derived for an arbitrary number of users in Refs. [13–15], and for
two users in Ref. [16]. The perfect secrecy capacity of the Gaussian scalar multi-receivers wiretap
channel, a degraded multi-receivers wiretap channel, was also derived in Refs. [17, 18]. Outage
capacity analysis was also proposed for Gaussian MIMO channel in several papers in the
literature, such as in Ref. [19].
About secrecy graph for network connectivity, based on a secrecy graph framework [20],
earlier work in the literature has proposed network connectivity models, based on this eaves-
dropper worse than receiver channel condition, showing that network connectivity can be
greatly affected by secrecy requirements, such as in Refs. [21, 22].
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3. System model
Partial secrecy can be achieved when energy per bit cost need to be reduced, and thus for
suitable applications the source may trade-off energy expenditure for secrecy rate. The com-
mon definition of secrecy capacity as the maximum rate at which the transmitted message can
be transmitted with perfect secrecy was adopted. For this scenario this chapter considers that
the initial stream of data can be split into private and non-private information sub-streams, but
without imposing the condition that the non-private sub-stream needs to correctly decoded by
the eavesdropper as in the previous work in Ref. [23]. R0 and Rs was denoted as the transmis-
sion rate of the non-private sub-stream and the private sub-stream, respectively, with the total
transmission rate being defined as Rt = R0 + Rs.
In partial secrecy, the equivocation rate may be smaller than the transmission rate at physical
layer. From information theoretic, transmission rate, R, is measured in bits per transmission, if
R bits information are transmitted by the transmitter. Assume that a maximum transmission
power P can be used by the transmitter, and that transmitter has limited battery energy. Hence
a performance metric, the energy per bit, is considered in partial secrecy. Therefore, the new
metric of partial secrecy is characterized by energy per bit, Eb. Although the actual transmis-
sion rate is related to the system bandwidth, energy per bit is beyond the scope of that
discussion. To characterize the energy efficiency of the transmission, the average energy per
bit consumption was defined as
ð1Þ
where P is the average power transmission constraint, and R is the number of bits per trans-
mission.
In partial secrecy, the minimum Distortion, Dmin, is the new metric at the application layer. The
new metric is measured the transmitted message, which can be guaranteed to achieve at the
eavesdropper. Also, the minimum Distortion is related to the transmission rate, and it accurately
represent the transmitted message. For illustration purposes, a very simple rate-distortion func-
tion was characterized the distortion in the source reconstruction of transmitted message at the
eavesdropper is defined as the ratio between the secrecy rate and the total transmission rate. The
minimum guaranteed distortion metric, Dmin, was defined as the percentage of the source rate
that achieves secrecy, and thus will not be available at the eavesdropper:
ð2Þ
4. Partial secrecy in one point to one point communication
In Gaussian fading channel model, the partial secrecy applied in two cases: the known full
channel CSI (Channel Statement Information) and known partial channel CSI, in which only
the main channel CSI is known and channel from source to eavesdropper is not known.
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Assume that the block length is large enough such that coding over one block can achieve a
small probability of error. The channel input-output relationship is given by
ð3Þ
where X is the channel input, and Y and Z are channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper, respectively. The channel gain coefficients h1 and h2 are proper complex random
variables. We assume that hi is a stationary and ergodic random process. The noise processes
W and V are zero-mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) proper complex Gauss-
ian random variables with variances μ2 and σ2, respectively. The input X is subject to the
average power constraint P. This chapter assumes different noise power levels and different
constant fading gain coefficients for the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. In the previ-
ous work [23], the ergodic partial secrecy capacity for this channel model is characterized as:
ð4Þ
where 1β is the fraction of the total power allocated to the common message, and β is the
fraction of the power budget that is allocated to the confidential message, which can be
determined optimally [23], such as to maximize the partial secrecy capacity Eq. (4).
As in Ref. [23], given the power budget P, β can be optimized to achieve the secrecy-capacity
boundary, under the observation that the secrecy-capacity region is convex:
ð5Þ
ð6Þ
For β ∈ [0,1], the condition should be satisfied
ð7Þ
The choice of the ratio γ1/γ0, characterizes the energy-secrecy trade-off, by influencing both the
achievable Rs, as well as the achievable Rt.
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For applications more sensitive to transmission delay constraints, the outage partial secrecy
capacity was investigate, defined as the maximum transmission and secrecy rate that can be
supported for a given outage probability constraint, under the assumption that both the
transmitter and the receiver have perfect channel-state information for both the regular trans-
mission, as well as for the eavesdropper channel. Here the assumption is that the transmitter
will defer transmission for the states that are associated with outage, and hence incur trans-
mission delay.
was used to represent a target rate pair. The non-private sub-stream is transmitted at
the rate R0, while the private sub-stream is transmitted at the rate Rs. If the target rate pair is
not achieved, an outage is claimed. The outage probability was defined as
ð8Þ
where is the secrecy capacity region for the channel with fading state, and
is the transmission power used by the source node. The transmission power is adapted to
the CSI. The outage probability is considered under a long-term average power constraint P, so
we have
ð9Þ
For this scenario, the Rayleigh-fading broadcast channel with confidential messages was
considered. Therefore |h1|
2 and |h2|
2 are exponentially distributed with parameters δ1 and
δ2, respectively.
From the partial secrecy capacity region Eq. (4) we have the following two conditions:
ð10Þ
Rewriting these conditions to reflect the constraints on the link gain values, such that the
required transmission rate (R0) and secrecy rates (Rs) are achievable, we obtain
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ð11Þ
Hence, the outage probability can be computed as the probability that the above conditions
hold,
ð12Þ
where and .
Similar as the known full channel CSI case, the partial secrecy-capacity region for the
guaranteed partial secrecy channel can be determined as:
ð13Þ
where p0 is the power allocated to the no-private message, and p1 is the power allocated to the
private message. This partial secrecy channel region relies on the assumption of large coher-
ence intervals and ensures that when h2 < h1. And the transmitter is under the power con-
straint
Advances in Security in Computing and Communications154
E P h1j jð Þ
2
h i
≤P: ð14Þ
For this scenario, the Rayleigh fading channel was considered. Therefore, in the Rayleigh
fading channel, the partial secrecy capacity region could be changed to
ð15Þ
It is easy to check that the objective function is concave in p1 and hence, by derivation approach
for maxing Rs, we get the following optimality condition
ð16Þ
For any main channel fading state is , and eavesdropper channel state is
. The optimal transmit power level p1 is determined from the above equation. If
the obtained power level turns out to be negative, then the optimal value of p1 is equal to 0.
In the Rayleigh fading channel, the condition can be rewrite as
ð17Þ
If there is no positive solution to this equation for a particular, then we set p1 = 0.
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From the partial secrecy capacity region formula, the two conditions is abstained as following:
ð18Þ
Rewriting these conditions to reflect the constraints on the link gains values such as given
transmission rate (R0) and secrecy rates (Rs) are achievable, we obtain:
ð19Þ
Hence, the outage probability could be computed as the probability that the above conditions
Eq. (19) do not hold.
ð20Þ
In order to determine the partial capacity region for the MIMO fading channels, this chapter
start from the results derived in Ref. [24] for perfect secrecy he MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel with non-private and confidential message. It expands the analysis in Ref. [24] to
account for the fading model presented in partial secrecy, and consider that the private sub-
stream will be transmitted as a private message (with rate Rs) and the no-private sub-stream
will have no secrecy constraints and only the constraint that it will be correctly received by the
intended receiver. The non-private stream will be transmitted with rate R0.
The partial secrecy capacity formula can be then be determined as:
ð21Þ
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where ()H denotes the Hermitian transpose. In a full-rank system, Eq. (21) can be simplified
by using singular value decomposition as
ð22Þ
where λi(H1H1
H) or λi(H2H2
H) are the eigenvalues of H1H1
H and H2H2
H. At the ith antennas,
the power allocation is (1βi)P for the non-private sub-stream, and the power allocation is βiP
for the private sub-stream.
As in Eq. (22), given that the power budget P, βi can be optimized to achieve the secrecy-capacity
boundary, and under the observation that the secrecy-capacity region is convex, we have the
optimization condition:
ð23Þ
By taking the derivative and setting it to 0 we get the optimal power allocation between the
non-private and private sub-streams:
ð24Þ
When there are stringent delay constraints, the transmitter cannot defer transmission and
consequently, for some states of the channel, and outage may occur. Outage the event is
defined as which the secrecy rate Rs is not contained in the partial secrecy capacity,
ð25Þ
In case of an outage, the private sub-stream is not secured against eavesdropping. The proba-
bility of this event happening is referred to as the secrecy outage probability.
Formula (22) shows the partial secrecy capacity, as a function of the eigenvalues of matrix
HkHk
H, which are random variables. The joint probability density function (pdf.) of these
eigenvalues, after being ordered according to their amplitude, has been shown in Ref. [19] to be
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ð26Þ
where KM,N is a normalizing factor.
Using the pdf in Eq. (26), the secrecy outage probability could be derived as follows
ð27Þ
where tr(A) denotes the trace of A, and is the expectation of
. P[x,a] is the normalized incomplete gamma function defined as
ð28Þ
5. Partial secrecy in network level communication
In the wireless network, the partial secrecy-capacity region for transmission between nodes i
and j, with eavesdropper e* is given similarly as Eq. (4)
ð29Þ
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Similar as Eq. (4), μ2 and σ2 represent the channel noise levels at the receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively. Also, P represents the transmission power, with a power fraction β which is
power allocation fraction to the private stream.
The average link gain in Eq. (29) can be determined based on the distance between the
receiving and the transmitting nodes:
ð30Þ
where α is the amplitude loss exponent.
Then e* is denoted the eavesdropper with the nearest to the transmitter i,
ð31Þ
To better analyze the privacy requirements on the network connectivity, we define the distance
ratio ξ, as the ratio of the distance between the transmitter and eavesdropper versus the
transmitter and receiver, as
ð32Þ
R is the maximum distance for transmission achievable between transmitter and receiver at
given rate and secrecy constraints. r is the minimum distance requirement between transmitter
and eavesdropper.
Using Eqs. (29) and (30) in conjunction with Eq. (32), we rewrite the partial secrecy capacity as
follows
ð33Þ
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The legitimate nodes and potential eavesdroppers are randomly located in the space according
to a Poisson Point Process. To capture Eq. (29), the distance between the transmitter to closest
eavesdropper node is further than the distance from transmitter to the receiver, which is
equivalent to a geometrical condition: r ≥ R.
The distance was derived to meet the constraints about the transmission rate, energy and
secrecy requirement, according to Eqs. (29) and (32). A family of graphs is characterize by the
secrecy and rate requirement.
Let denote the set of legitimate nodes, and denote the set of
eavesdroppers. We define the rate secrecy family of graphs , characterized by
energy per bit and secrecy rate requirements, as the graph with vertex set and edge set
ð34Þ
where Cps is the partial secrecy capacity of the link between the transmitter xi and the receiver
xj, such as in Eqs. (29) and (30). η
0 is a threshold of the minimum required transmission rate for
the communication link, and η0D is a threshold is the required minimum secrecy rate for the
communication links.
The condition of the edge in Eq. (34) can be rewrote as a geometrical relationship between the
requirements for the distance from transmitter to receiver, and to the eavesdropper, as a
function of distortion and energy per bit based on Eqs. (29) and (33), with η = η0/2:
ð35Þ
Figure 1 shows the dependence of the achievable secrecy rate, the overall transmission rate, the
non-private stream rate and the distortion at the eavesdropper, as functions of the distance
ratio metric. Numerical results were obtained for α = 2 and μ2 = σ2 = 1. Unless otherwise
specified, R = 1.
Figure 1 shows us that the highest transmission rate, yielding the most energy efficient
transmission, is obtained for the case in which the eavesdropper is more further than the
legitimate receiver, larger ξ. This case also related to perfect secrecy, but it will enforce more
stricter constraints for the link availability at the network level. Hence it will negatively impact
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connectivity. If the eavesdropper is closer to the transmitter, the network connectivity is
improved, while the higher energy expense is also much higher.
As in Ref. [20], the Poisson rate-secrecy graph is defined. In the Poisson rate-secrecy graph, Π,
ΠE are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λ and λE,
respectively, and consider λ = 1. But the rate-secrecy graphs are redefined by the transmission
range and the distance ratio requirements by incorporate energy and secrecy constraints.
The edge condition in Eq. (35) is rewrite based on definition Eq. (34):
ð36Þ
Eq. (37) shows that a rate-secrecy capacity feasibility condition can be obtained by requiring to
be positive, and it is given by
ð37Þ
The bounds in Eqs. (36) and (37) hold for β ∈ [0,1].
Eq. (37) gives a bound on the maximum transmission range that can be achieved, given
transmission rate, energy per bit consumption, and eavesdropper’s distortion constraints. For
a given transmission rate and distortion requirements, the range of transmission can be made
infinitely large by allowing infinitely large transmission power, with the energy per bit con-
sumption going to infinity.
Figure 1. Secrecy-energy-connectivity trade-offs.
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From Eqs. (36) and (37), it shows that secrecy can be achieved when we impose a range and a
distance ratio constraint. The connectivity of the network is analyzed by determining the out-
degree distributions of the nodes, and the probability of out-isolation, and the average out-degree
for an arbitrary node in the network are studied.
There are two cases, which are worth to study: (a) the range limited case – for which distance
from transmitter and receiver, R, is limited to a maximum value; (b) the unlimited case -
, which corresponds to the unlimited transmission power case.
For the range limited case, unlimited transmission power and no range transmission limit is
imposed. To calculate the out-degree of a vertex, we follow a derivation similar to that in
Eq. (35), where it replaces the condition R < r. The out-degree probability can be wrote as:
ð38Þ
The probability that the origin node cannot communicate with another node in
(out-isolation) is then determined to be
ð39Þ
When a transmission power constraint is imposed, a maximum transmission range R can be
determined as in Eq. (37).
As in Ref. [20], this thesis distinguishes two cases:
1. There is no eavesdropper inside a circle with radius r = ξR. This case occurs with proba-
bility
ð40Þ
For this case, the number of good nodes inside the radius R is given by a Poisson
distribution, with the mean, piR2.
2. There is an eavesdropper at the distance, ρ. Then the number of good nodes is given by a
Poisson distribution restricted to a radius R0 = ρ/ξ, with the mean of piR02 = piρ2/ξ2.
Averaging cases (1) and (2) and making the change of variable r = ρ2/ξ2, we obtain an out-degree
probability expression similar to that in Ref. [20], but for an enhanced equivalent arrival rate for
the eavesdropper, :
ð41Þ
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in which a is piR2(λ*E + 1), and R is transmission range radius. Also, Γ(.,.) is the upper
incomplete gamma function.
Hence, the probability of out-isolation is derived as
ð42Þ
The mean out-degree or in-degree can be determined to be
ð43Þ
To achieve numerical results, we assume λ = 1 m2 and λE = 0.08 m
2. Figure 2 analyzes the
out-degree probability on different secrecy level, D. The secrecy level is selected for perfect
secrecy (D = 1) and for a value of distortion that gives a good level of privacy (D = 0.6). In
Figure 2, the significant impact on network connectivity works when the secrecy constraint
imposes. Note also that ξ = 1, which is the secrecy constraint imposed in Eq. (33), yields
non-secrecy (D = 0), when transmission rate and energy constraints are also imposed.
In Figure 3, it shows the probability of out-isolation and the mean out degree distribution at the
case of limited transmission range. When the secrecy level increases, the probability of out-
isolation significantly increases. At the perfect secrecy situation, under transmission rate require-
ments, a minimum value of ξ, 2.5, is required (see Figure 1). And at the perfect secrecy, it leads to
a 3.4 times increasing in the out-isolation probability and a 58% decreasing in the average mean
Figure 2. Out-degree probability—unlimited range scenario.
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degree, compared to the perfect secrecy studied in Ref. [20]. We also note that by relaxing the
secrecy requirements, the out-isolation probability will reduce and the mean out-degree will
improve. For example, choosing a distortion at the eavesdropper of D = 0.6 (obtained for ξ = 2),
there is a 73% decreasing for the out-isolation probability and a 72% increasing in the mean
out-degree, compared to the case of perfect secrecy (obtained for ξ = 2.5).
6. Further works
The partial secrecy could also applies in the multi-nodes communication, such as relay-
eavesdropper channel. In the no relay case, the source and receiver cannot have secure com-
munication when the eavesdropper’s channel is the same or better than the receiver’s channel
holds. In the relay case, although the source and receiver cannot have secure communication,
while they can achieve the partial secrecy. Assuming the nodes of eavesdropper is the ran-
domly distributed in the area, the probability of achieving at least a secrecy level of medium
secrecy level could be characterized based on the properties of the random distribution.
Also, for the network level, the partial secrecy could be studied in different distribution of
nodes. For example, the case that users are uniformly distributed in area could be considered.
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